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Abstract
This paper investigates whether job stability in western Germany shows any signs of decline
and compares the findings to evidence for the US and the UK. Cross sectional data and
calendar information from the German Socioeconomic Panel 1984-1997 are combined
allowing to check possible influences of oversampling long jobs in cross sectional data. Three
different measures are looked at. All indicate that there is a decline in job stability, not fully
explained by the business cycle: median elapsed tenure of male workers declined from around
10 years to 8.5, the probability to be in short jobs seems to increase relatively steadily for both
males and females, and the hazard for job ending has become increasingly higher despite the
fact that the economy experienced the post-unification boom and the current recession.
Cox proportional hazard models for different groups in the labor market show that
men and women are equally affected. Part-time workers, although generally more likely to
end their job, have suffered less. As ’outsiders’ are more likely to have difficulties finding
stable jobs in rough times separate analyses are carried out those who have entered the job
directly from unemployment or non-participation and workers who enter the labor market
having just finished their highest degree. These are compared to the ’insiders’ who switch jobs
directly. While ’insiders’ are less likely to leave their new job, outsiders face increasing risks
of job termination.
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11. Introduction
In Germany the casual public sentiment is that job security is on the decline and that jobs
have become less stable since the 70s due to structural changes in labor markets. It is usually
argued that globalization and technological progress have increased the need for flexibility
leading to less secure jobs for workers. Obviously secure and stable jobs are desirable at least
from the workers point of view, as long as no better employment opportunities arise. On the
other hand too much stability can be harmful if necessary changes in the labor market are
delayed. Job stability is discussed in western Europe as well as in the United States and while
studies for the US and the UK present some limited evidence of increasing job instability
(compare Burgess and Rees 1996, 1997, 1998; Farber 1995; Swinnerton and Wial 1995;
Diebold et al. 1997) the rare empirical evidence for Germany is very controversial.
Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1997) report decreasing numbers of job changes as evidence
for even an increase in job stability. Bergemann and Schneider (1998), however, find some
support for declining job stability in Germany. They present some descriptive statistics for
jobs that started within a certain period, so their results cannot be directly compared to
international evidence that looks at the tenure distribution for all jobs in the economy.
Moreover, the group of job starters is very heterogeneous and different tendencies could exist
for ’insiders’ who only switch jobs and ’outsiders’ who try to (re-)enter the labor market from
unemployment, non-participation or training and education. This study adds to the literature
by presenting a collection of cross sectional measures for overall job stability in Germany and
looking at the different groups who start new jobs in the period 1984-1997 within duration
models.
Previous studies are usually based only on cross sectional tenure information of those
currently in work (with one exception being Booth et al. 1996). It is well known that this type
of analysis undersamples short jobs. This is also a likely problem in the papers by Bergemann
and Schneider (1998) and Bergemann (1999), who only used information on jobs existing at
the time of the interview. Therefore, longitudinal information of the so-called "calendar" of
the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) will be combined with cross sectional
information, to see whether using only information of those currently in work influences the
analysis. All currently available waves of the GSOEP between 1984 and 1997 are used.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on job stability changes
and shortly discusses the possible theoretical linkages between structural changes and job
stability. In Section 3 some cross sectional evidence on elapsed tenure stratified by age, sex
and industry is presented and compared to the most recent literature on job stability that
2focuses on the United States and the UK primarily. Multivariate analysis is introduced as well
to show whether the probability to be in short or very long jobs has changed. The main
hypothesis under investigation is whether average job tenure decreased since re-unification in
West Germany. Section 4 takes the analysis further and looks at job stability for workers
starting new jobs in a multivariate framework: men and women, part-time and full-time
workers, job switchers and possible outsiders like labor market entrants and workers entering
from unemployment or non-participation. Longitudinal data from the employment calendar in
the GSOEP is combined with cross sectional information on important covariates to estimate
Cox proportional hazard models, which directly take into account the right censoring of the
tenure variable. Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes.
2. A Decline in Job Stability - Evidence from the Literature
While the effects of structural change, "globalization" and technological progress on wage
differentials have been of some concern in recent years1, we hardly know anything about the
consequences for job stability patterns. A decline in job stability, however, could certainly be
part of the adaptation mechanism to structural changes and exogenous shocks, especially for
sensitive groups in the labor market like unskilled workers and unemployed workers looking
for new jobs (compare Farber 1995). Job stability can be measured in several different ways,
but the most frequently used operationalizations are elapsed or completed tenure with one
firm, that is job changes or promotions within firms are usually not looked at.2
We know from the literature that these job switches and therefore "unstable" jobs are
not necessarily a bad thing. Workers who switch jobs voluntarily often improve their earnings
or work conditions of their jobs (Jovanovic 1979).3 We also know that (voluntary) quits are
procyclical, while (involuntary) layoffs are countercyclical both influencing the tenure
distribution. In boom periods more new jobs are created leading automatically to more jobs
with short duration and, therefore, decreasing tenure usually even if layoffs are reduced. In
recessions there will be more layoffs, less quits and average tenure is likely to increase as new
hires are rare (Burgess and Rees 1996, Schettkatt 1996).
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 See e.g. Katz and Murphy 1992; Levy and Murnane 1992; Krugman 1994; Leamer 1994 and 1996; Abraham
and Houseman, 1995; Freeman and Katz 1995.
2
 As workers in large firms have more career possibilities within their firm it is usually observed that workers
from large firms change their employer less often then workers from small employers. Therefore, firm size
happens to be an important covariate to be included in the following multivariate studies.
3
 See Mertens (1998) for an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on job mobility.
3However, the distribution of job tenure in an economy seems to change very slowly so
that business cycle influences seem to be of minor importance in comparison with structural
conditions and institutional settings. Burgess and Rees (1996) report that although business
cycle phenomena exist, changing the distribution of elapsed tenure, there is no long term
trend. The same result is found when looking at the estimated distribution of completed tenure
as indicated by retention rates. These are the probabilities that a worker with a certain age and
tenure will retain her job for one, two, or more years (Burgess and Rees 1997).4 Booth et al.
(1996) analyze the tenure pattern using the BHPS retrospective data over a long time period.
They show that since the 1950s there has been a small decline in job tenure in the UK.
Similar results are reported for the United States by Farber (1995) and Dieboldt et al.
(1996, 1997). Only Swinnerton and Wial (1995, 1996) reported declines in job stability while
Diebold et al. (1996,1997) show that tenure distributions are rather stable over time.5 Finally,
Farber (1995) reports that men are increasingly less likely to be observed in long jobs while
women’s probability of being in long jobs increased significantly. According to Farber’s
estimates much of the negative change for men is driven by a decreasing probability for male
workers with low education to be in long jobs, i.e. those groups in the labor market that
experienced the greatest decline in relative wage rates during the 1980s. Female workers in
the lowest educational group experience the smallest increase in the probability of being in
long jobs.
That there probably is less job stability in the U.S. can also be seen from studies on
worker displacement.6 These show that job loss increased since the 1970’s affecting more and
more also high tenure and white collar workers. Especially the facts reported by Farber (1997)
cast some doubts on the notion that job stability did not change: job loss in the recession of
1981-1983 accounted to around 13% of the workforce. The three year rate of job loss
decreased until the period 87-89 and then rose to the highest level since 1981: 15% of the
workforce lost their job in a period of expansion between 1993 and 1995. As Kletzer (1998)
writes, "These high rates of job loss are consistent with public perceptions of rising job
insecurity" (see also DiPrete 1993). Even Dieboldt et al. (1996,1997) report for the U.S. that
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 Hall (1982) was the first to estimate historical rates from CPS data by comparing the number of workers in an
age-tenure category in one survey (e.g. those 25-29 years old with 0-5 years of tenure in 1968, say 5000) with
the number in a later survey in correspondingly higher age and tenure categories (e.g. those 35-39 years old with
10-15 years of tenure in 1978, say 2000). The historical retention rate in this case equals 2000/5000 = 0.4, i.e.
40% of those between 25 and 29 in 1968 will hold jobs that will last for ten more years. Ureta (1992),
Swinnerton and Wial (1995) and Diebold et al. (1996,1997) extended the analysis to later years and refined the
estimation procedure.
5
 For recent overviews of the literature in the U.S. see Schmidt and Svorny (1998) or Jaeger and Stevens (1998).
6
 Another strand of literature not reviewed here is concerned with gross job and workers flows looking at job
creation and destruction at the firm level (see Davis and Haltiwanger 1992; Leonard and Schettkatt 1991).
4"Although the differences in the changes in retention rates by age group are not dramatic, it is
nonetheless interesting that the decline is greatest for young workers, who also experienced
the largest relative wage decrease" (p. 219). Gregg and Wadsworth (1995) have similarly
argued for the UK that entry positions available to those currently not in employment might
have become increasingly unstable and low paid. These studies suggest that looking at the
most sensitive groups of the labor market in more detail may yield helpful insights into the
question of whether job stability decreased. However, the next Section 3 will first look at
general trends in job stability in western Germany to compare them to the international
evidence. Section 4 then goes on to analyze more closely workers starting jobs within the time
period under investigation like workers (re-)entering from unemployment or non-participation
as well as workers entering from education and training.
3. General Trends in the Tenure Distribution
Between 1984 and 1989 the West German economy recovered from a recession in the early
80s leading to falling unemployment rates and slightly better job prospects for workers as can
be seen from Figure 1. In 1990, the year of re-unification, however, there has been a
pronounced boom bringing capacities in West Germany to their limits. This was primarily due
to increasing demand for West German products in East Germany. This boom ended
dramatically in 1993 followed by a recession that has not really come to an end, yet.
Unemployment in West Germany has since then increased and growth rates are at relatively
low levels. The following analysis will therefore compare the immediate post-reunification
period 1990-92 and the later recession period 1993-97 with job stability from 1984-89.
As described in the preceding section one natural way to measure job stability is
elapsed firm tenure or job duration. Using this simple measure some trends for western
Germany will be described here. All calculations are based on the two original west German
samples of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) which includes information on
elapsed firm tenure for all workers employed at the time of the interview.7 Table 1 shows the
well known fact that median tenure differs significantly by gender. While men’s median
tenure starts with 10 years in 1984 and ends with 8.5 years in 1997 women’s median tenure is
relatively constant at 6 years.
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 As households with non-German heads are heavily oversampled in the GSOEP all frequencies and medians
reported are weighted by the cross sectional sample weight made available in the GSOEP. For further
information on the data set see the appendix.
5Now, it is important to distinguish different age groups because obviously older
workers are able to accrue longer tenure than young workers. Age is therefore used as a (non-
ideal) proxy for labor market experience and median tenure is reported for the groups 16-25
years, 26-45 years and 46-65 years in Figure 2. The difference between men and women is
evident only in the older age groups. Younger female workers between 16 and 25 have tenure
comparable to men. What is more striking, however, is that median tenure decreases for the
young and middle age groups between 25 and 45 but increases especially for male workers
between 46 and 65. The female experience  is strikingly different to results reported by Farber
(1995), Marcotte (1995) and Burgess and Rees (1998) for the United States and the UK. It
seems that while women in the US and the UK were able to accrue longer tenure over time,
German women were only able to hold the level already acquired in the mid-1980s.
Another interesting detail of the tenure pattern has been pointed out by Gregg and
Wadsworth (1995). They show for the UK that considerable variation in tenure by
employment type can exist with increasing separation probabilities for part-timers.  Therefore,
Figure 3 shows average tenure by regular hours worked. Men in part-time jobs and marginal
employment8 obviously have lower median tenure than full-time workers, however only
around 3% of male workers can be found in these categories (own calculations from the
GSOEP, see also Hoffmann and Walwei 1998). Median tenure calculated for other than full-
time male workers is very erratic and the observed decline in median tenure therefore seems
to be due to decreasing median tenure in full-time employment.9 As would have been
expected women are more frequently found in part-time work (around 30%). It is interesting
to see that this type of work is even associated with slightly higher median tenure than full-
time work and there are no clear tendencies over time for all employment types.
Similarly, tenure by industry differs more strongly for men than for women as can be
seen from Figure 5 where the most important sectors are depicted. In trade, services and
manufacturing median tenure decreased between 1984 and 1997 by 1 to 2 years. In the state
sector median tenure even increased. This is probably due to reduced hiring by the state.
Another possibility to analyze job stability is to look at the tenure distribution in a
multivariate context originally proposed by Farber (1995) and extended by Burgess and Rees
(1998). In order to measure changes in the distribution of job duration, dummy variables
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 There are strict definitions for marginal employment in Germany. Working either below 15 hours or receiving
monthly wages of only 620 DM (margin since 1998).
9
 In 1988 around 3000 male workers are observed in full-time employment and only around 60 in part-time or
marginal employment.
6indicating whether a worker is in a job with duration of one year or less (respectively
morethan ten years or more than twenty years) are regressed on a set of covariates in a
discrete choice model. Following Farber (1995) Logit estimations are presented, however
using Probits does not change the pattern of the results. All employed individuals between 16
and 64 are selected for the logit of the probability of job duration one year or less. For the
probability of a job duration of more than ten or twenty years the sample only includes
workers who are at least 35 or 45 years old respectively. Moreover, self-employed, trainees
and workers in agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), non-profit organizations and
observations with missing values on at least one covariate were deleted from the sample.10
The covariates included here are age dummy variables for age categories (16-19, 20-
24, 25-29, 30-34, and so on), dummy variables for educational attainment, changes in the
national unemployment rate, firm size dummies, a part time indicator, white and blue collar
workers dummies and industry dummies. All these variables are known to influence
employment prospects and mobility patterns (for an overview see e.g. Mertens 1998). There
are two different ways to test whether the probability to be in short jobs increased while the
probability to be in long jobs decreased, both indicating a decline in job stability. Following
Farber (1995) a linear time trend variable is included first. Results are presented in Table 2
columns I, IV and VI. A complete set of results can be found in Appendix Tables A1-A3. For
both men and women the probability to be in short jobs has increased significantly, while the
probability to be in jobs that last at least ten years has decreased. There is no significant
change for jobs that last at least twenty years, i.e. for very long jobs corresponding to findings
that elapsed tenure for the oldest group of workers did not decrease (see Figure 2).
As we are especially interested in the question of whether job stability declined in the
post-reunification period a  dummy variable approach is followed next. Column 2 shows that
a dummy variable separating the post-reunification years 1990-1997 from the pre-unification
period in our data set (1984-1989) is positive and significant for short jobs and negative
significant for long jobs. However, the post-reunification period can be separated into a boom
period (1990-1992) and a recession period (1993-1997) as already argued in the introduction
(see Figure 1). In a boom period it should generally be the case that the probability to be in
short jobs increases, as there are more new jobs leading to workers quitting more often and
unemployed workers having better chances to find a job. In recessions, however, the opposite
should be the case. If we find increasing probabilities to be in short jobs in a recession this
could indeed be an indication of declining job stability and security for workers. Columns III,
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 Including all sectors does not influence the central results of the analysis.
7V and VII report the results of this exercise: in the latest period the probability to be in short
jobs is higher than in the boom period following reunification. The probability to be in long
jobs only decreased in the recession period. There is no theory to explain that such a
development could be caused by voluntarily job terminations in a recession. It is more likely
that involuntary separations are the major reason, but this will be discussed in more detail in
the next section. Considering that this type of analysis does not account for the fact that there
has been an increasing number of people looking for work, the result seems even more
worrying.
The results presented so far suffice to give a first overview of what has been going on
with respect to overall job stability in western Germany. It has been shown that especially
younger and middle aged workers are affected by a decline in job stability. Moreover, the
logit anaylsis has shown that jobs seem to end earlier. This question, however, can better be
analyzed using duration analysis. Therefore, the next section goes one step further and
focuses on the question of whether jobs that start after unification are likely to end earlier than
jobs that started earlier. Having shown that older workers and jobs that have been going on
for a very long time are not affected by a decline in job stability this is a reasonable
procedure.
4. Do new jobs tend to end earlier in recent years?
In this section job stability will be studied collecting evidence on job termination directly. For
Germany there exist few studies looking at similar problems. Winkelmann and Zimmermann
(1997) estimate count data regression models from the German Socioeconomic Panel. They
regress the number of job changes between 1974 and 1994 on a set of individual
characteristics, however, they are interested in the general trend comparing the 70s with the
90s rather than pre- and post-unification. They find that the coefficient on a time dummy
indicating the period between 1984 and 1994 is significantly negative, i.e. controlling for
individual characteristics the number of job moves has decreased, which might be interpreted
as an increase in job stability rather than a decrease. The analysis most related to this work is
a study parallely developed by Bergemann (1999). While this study here focuses on the
different groups in the labor market, hers focuses on the different reasons for job terminations.
However, there are two drawbacks of her use of the GSOEP data. First, she does not use the
spell data given in the GSOEP calendar that collects information on every month in the panel
8but rather extracts duration of jobs going on at the interview period only. Therefore, she
cannot be sure whether the undersampling of short jobs biases her results seriously. The
second problem arises from the same fact: looking at the different reasons for separations she
has to match information on "Why did your previous job end" with job information from the
last panel wave. Obviously there will be cases in which this is not the correct job as there
might have been a short job in-between. This study overcomes these problems and shows that
the general tendency of results is still the same.
The Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Cox proportional hazard models will be used to study the duration of jobs. This model has
been frequently used in mobility analyses (see e.g. Mayer and Caroll 1990). Similarly to
Booth et al. (1996) dummy variables indicating the time periods are included in the estimation
controlling for a set of covariates known to influence mobility behavior. As already discussed
in Section 3 three different time periods in Germany are distinguished: pre-unification (1984-
1989) and post-unification separated into boom (1990-1992) and recession (1993-1997).












where Pr(.) is the probability of leaving the job with one employer between t and t+∆ given
that the job is still held at time t (see for this and the following e.g. Blossfeld et al. 1986, 1989
or Kiefer 1988). This probability is also defined by the density function f(t) divided by the
survival function S(t). In the following the popular proportional hazard assumption will be
employed to analyze the influence of important covariates x on hazard rate:
λ(t,x,β, λ0) = φ( x,β) λ0(t) (2)
where β is the unknown parameter vector and λ0 is the "baseline" hazard corresponding to φ(.)
= 1. If φ(.) = 1 is measured at the mean of the regressors then λ0 has an interpretation as the
hazard function for the mean individual in the sample. Using the partial-likelihood approach
9originally suggested by Cox (1972) the coefficient vector β can be estimated without
specifying the form of the baseline hazard function λ0:
λ(t,x,β, λ0) = exp( x’β) λ0(t) (4)
One of the advantages of hazard rate models is that right censoring which limits the
informational content of elapsed tenure in cross sectional analyses is explicitly dealt with (see
Blossfeld et al. 1986 or Kiefer 1988).11 In the remaining part of this section the job duration
of all jobs beginning since 1984 will be analyzed. Special groups proposed to be likely
’victims’ of a decrease in job stability like workers entering from unemployment, non
participation or training and schooling will be investigated in turn.
Data
Like in the preceding section data from the GSOEP is used, but this time the calendar
information, where all interviewed persons are asked about their major occupations on a
monthly basis. The GSOEP is a yearly panel so this data base includes valuable information
on job spells, especially also those spells that only last a few months and neither coincide with
the interview month in the current year nor in the previous year. Additional information on
job changes that are collected at each interview are used to split employment spells if
necessary.12 In the final sample only those spells were included that started since January
1984. Self-employed workers, trainees and civil servants were excluded as were the sectors
agriculture (including forestry and fisheries) and private households. Full-time and part-time
jobs enter the analysis. Table 3 gives information on the frequencies of all important
covariates for the following analyses.
Unfortunately, there is no job information available for the jobs that do not coincide
with interviews but it is possible to at least combine the jobs with detailed cross sectional
information that coincide with the interview months. Two types of analysis are therefore
possible: i) using all available spells and including dummy variables equaling one when the
information is missing and ii) using only those spells with complete information on important
covariates. Using calendar should in any case be superior to using only cross sectional
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 Ties are handled using the Peto-Breslow approximation. The estimation used the software package STATA.
12
 Detailed information on the data selection process is given in the appendix.
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information from the GSOEP. One major reason is that interview information on the reason
for job change can be attributed to the latest observed employment spell even if that job did
only last for a short time and did not coincide with the previous interview. The probability to
combine job change information with the wrong job is therefore minimized here. Moreover,
the calendar includes better information on the labor market status of workers prior to starting
the new job, which enables to look at those workers who enter a job directly from
unemployment.
The Average of all New Job Spells
Lets first look whether there is a general tendency that jobs starting between 1993-97 end
earlier than jobs started in the 1980s or the immediate post-unification period. Table 4
presents the results for a variety of specifications of Cox proportional hazard models. The
unemployment rate is included as a time varying variable. Specification I shows results for all
12,564 observed spells in the calendar. Personal characteristics like age at start of the job, sex,
schooling and unemployment experience are available for all spells as is the full-time/part-
time information. For other covariates missing indicator dummies have to be included. The
results show that controlling for the aforementioned influences as well as firm size, industry,
blue/white collar status, and the business cycle via the unemployment rate, there seems to be a
tendency for increasing risks of job termination as indicated by the two time dummies (1990-
1992) and (1993-1997). Reported are hazard ratios or α-coefficients from the Cox model,
where α=exp(β) and (α-1) × 100 equals the percentage effect of a covariate on the job
separation risk. While the risk of job termination increased by around 9% in the immediate
period following reunification in comparison with the 1980s, the risk increased by 18% in the
period 1993-1997. Even controlling for unemployment in the year of job ending, jobs tend to
end earlier in later years. This effect also remains true when censoring all observations at a
maximum of 6 years duration, so this is not an artifact of the possible different time duration.
Simple survivor functions in Figure 5 show a similar picture, although differences there are
not very large. The multivariate analysis however is superior and indicates that workers with
the same characteristics are more likely to leave their job now than in the mid-1980s. These
findings support the logit models estimated in Section 3: job stability in Germany has been
declining since the mid-1980s. Part-timers, though in general more likely to end a job, have
been influenced less by this development and seem to experience a smaller increase in job
11
terminations. This can be seen from an interaction variable between a part-time dummy and
the time period dummies. Therefore, it is important to include this interaction in all
specifications.
The following column II shows whether the same result can be obtained using only
those observations with valid information on all included explanatory variables and the reason
for job termination. While the direction and significance of the time dummy variables and its
interactions are the same, the size of the coefficients increases. It therefore seems that using
only those jobs with valid information on all variables exaggerates the size of the effect,
though not the general trend in the data. However, one has to be extremely careful when
interpreting the results. For the rest of this paper only those results using all spells will be
reported.
So far the different reasons for job change have not been distinguished, but it is also
interesting to know why jobs end, as quits and layoffs tend to have different consequences
(for Germany see Burda and Mertens 1998, 1999). The increase in the risk of job termination
between 1990-1992 could be explained with increasing separations given new job
opportunities, the increase during the latter phase, however, is more likely to be caused by
involuntary job endings as recessions and increasing unemployment are unlikely to go hand in
hand with increasing voluntary quits. Bergemann (1999) follows Booth et al. (1996) and
presents some evidence on this point by looking at the different reasons for job termination
within competing risks models. She reports that especially men experience an increase in the
risk of job termination by layoffs in the 1990s while the hazard of job termination by quits has
not increased significantly. For women other reasons than quits or layoffs seem to be more
important (everything from child care to early retirement). The specification presented in
column III supports her findings. Including interactions between a layoff dummy and the time
dummies it can be shown there is indeed a tendency for an increasing risk of job termination
by layoffs. Inclusion of those interactions leaves only the second time dummy for 1993-1997
significant at a lower significance level than before. Again these effects are stronger when
only including spells without missing values as can be seen from column IV.
Before turning to an analysis of different labor market groups the other controls in the
Cox models will shortly be discussed in turn. The unemployment rate, which is the only
variable that is allowed to vary in the analysis is always negative and significant, i.e. it acts as
a kind of lagged indicator of the business cycle. When unemployment rates are already high,
overall job terminations, voluntary and involuntary, are lower. Personal unemployment
experience is only found to be significant at usual significance levels in the analysis where all
12
spells are included. This is what could be expected, assuming that workers with
unemployment experience differ in their unobserved characteristics from other workers who
never experienced unemployment. Consistent with findings in the mobility literature workers
who are older at entry into the labor market have a lower risk of job termination, as younger
workers are usually found to be more mobile. Non-German citizens as well as females are
found to have lower risk of job termination, however, only after controlling for the other
worker and job characteristics. In general woman have higher separation hazards from jobs
that last longer than around four years as can be seen from the graph of survivor functions in
Figure 6. Females with the same characteristics as men, though, are found to be less mobile,
at least in jobs that started since 1984.
Training dummies and occupational position dummies have to be interpreted together
as both tell us something about the type of education. Significance varies strongly between
the two specifications, but it seems that workers with technical training are less likely to leave
a job than workers without training or workers holding a university degree. Much of the
training and education effects are also captured in the worker status dummies: all status
groups are less likely to end their job than unskilled blue collar workers. As usually found in
the literature workers from small firms have higher risks of job termination than workers from
medium sized or large firms. Finally, the dummies indicating missing variable status are
always positive and significant as they catch much of the effect that short jobs are
underrepresented in a cross section.
Workers Switching Jobs
Having looked at the average tendencies we now go on to look at special groups who start
new jobs between 1984 and 1997. Workers switching directly from a full-time job into
another job will serve as a reference for those workers who enter work from unemployment,
non-participation or training. As the number of coefficients estimated is very high detailed
results are to be found in the appendix only.13 Table 5 reports the results on the time dummies
and interactions for part time workers. Surprisingly the results turn around: workers switching
into another full-time employment are less likely to leave their jobs in the post-unification
period (though the coefficient is only marginally significant). On the other hand workers who
switch from full-time into part-time employment are more likely to leave their job. Both
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13
effects get even stronger when controlling for involuntary separations (see Appendix Table
A4). These findings support results of Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1997) who reported a
declining number of job switches over time in West Germany.
Summarizing we can already note that it might be misleading to look only at the
average tendencies for all new jobs within a period, as workers starting new jobs are
obviously very heterogeneous. The following sections will show which groups are the ones
that are most seriously affected by an increasing risk in job termination.
Workers Entering From Unemployment or Non-Participation
As Table 3 shows, a considerable part of all workers who start new jobs come directly from
unemployment (around 23%) or non-participation (25%). These groups should be of major
concern as it is important especially for unemployed workers and workers seeking from non-
participation to find their way back into the labor market. Table 5 consequently repeats the
analysis for workers entering from unemployment and non-participation in rows III and IV.
The unemployment experience dummy in the former case catches whether this has been their
first unemployment spell (dummy=0) or at least their second unemployment spell
(dummy=1). The other included variables are the same as in the previous analysis (see also
Appendix Table A5).
For workers unemployed prior to the present job spell the recession period 1993-97 is
of major importance. The estimated coefficient, however, hardly differs from the average
reported in Table 4. Again the increase in job instability can be attributed primarily to layoffs
as indicated by the interaction variable (and reported in Table 6). Workers entering from non-
participation have obviously more problems as their risk of job termination is 25% in the
period 1993-1997 in comparison with 18% on average. Considering that most workers
entering from non-participation are females it will be interesting to see in a next step whether
there is a difference between males and females.
Job Terminations by Females and Males
The analyses are now repeated for males and females and also reported in Table 5. Rows V
and VI show that both males and females were obviously affected by a decline in job stability
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during the 1990s. However, it can be shown that the effect for women does not disappear
once controlling for involuntary separations, indicating that other reasons are of greater
importance (see Table 6 and Appendix Table A6; also compare Bergemann 1999). The
following rows VII and VIII in Table 5 show that the decreasing risk of job termination for
full-time working job switchers is driven by male workers experiences. Female full-time
workers do not experience any significant change.
Separating again between workers coming from different non-employment status
yields further interesting results. Male workers leaving unemployment seem to have
increasing and higher difficulties in finding a stable job than others: their risk of job
termination in the period 1993-97 is around 3% higher than on average (column IX). Workers
who leave non-participation, however, are primarily female and have similarly  problems in
finding a stable job (see column XII).14 In combination with the reported results on job
switchers this clearly supports the idea that outsiders have less opportunities to get stable
positions in the labor market in the 1990s. In the next and final section we therefore look at
another group of outsiders, namely those who have just recently finished a degree and have to
find an appropriate job now.
Young Workers Having Recently Finished a Degree
In Germany of all workers around 68% have some kind of practical training. Skills acquired
during this training are usually thought to be transferable across firms but hardly across
occupations. Winkelmann (1996) reports that 70% of all apprenticeship trained workers leave
their training firm within 5 years but some occupational mobility is observed even directly
following the apprenticeship (compare Allmendinger 1989 and Werwatz, 1998).
In the following we will see whether job duration in the first job after apprenticeship
or other forms of vocational training decreased after re-unification in Germany. The definition
of labor market entrants follows Winkelmann (1996) and includes three comparative groups:
secondary school leavers, young workers who have just received a university degree and
workers who have just left school and report full-time or part-time employment as primary
occupation. Note that this group of workers does not necessarily have to enter directly from
education, as there could have been short unemployment spells or non-participation spells in-
between. Some graduates who did a degree in the evening while working are also included.
                                                       
14
 Compare for complete set of results Appendix Table A7.
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Only workers entering the labor market until the age of 30 are included. If there is more than
a years’ gap between an education and a job spell the individual is not included in the sample.
Again Table 5 reports the results which show a similar picture: the risk of job ending
increases following unification in western Germany, but labor market entrants do not seem to
be affected above average (also compare Appendix Table A8) .
5. Conclusions
The analyses have found some support for decreasing job stability in western Germany,
however not all groups in the labor market are equally affected. Using repeated cross sections
from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) it was shown that male workers have
experienced a decrease in median tenure from around 10 years to 8.5 years between 1984 and
1997. While women in other countries like the US or the UK were able to accrue higher
median tenure on average, there has not been such an increase in Germany between 1984 and
1997. On the contrary, women’s probability to be in long jobs decreased just like men’s and
the probability to be in short jobs increased, which indicates that jobs tend to end earlier in
recent years.
The latter questions, which is of major importance can, however, be better dealt with
using duration analysis. Moreover, repeated cross sectional analysis, does not tell the whole
story, as short jobs are undersampled and the effect of the increasing number of workers who
are in and out of very short jobs is therefore neglected. Hence, the duration of jobs has been
looked at more closely using job spell information from the GSOEP calendar combined with
cross sectional information. Cox proportional hazard models for workers starting new jobs
between 1984 and 1997 show that there is indeed a decline in job stability over the nineties
that is even stronger in the recession period of 1993-1997 than in the post-reunification boom.
The results are thus similar to those obtained using simple cross sectional information.
However, disaggregating the job starters into distinct groups shows that not all of them are
equally affected.
Considering insider-outsider theories (see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower 1988) it can be
predicted that workers who are outside the system will be hurt most when there is a decrease
in job stability. This has also been proposed by Gregg and Wadsworth (1995). Along this line
of reasoning, separate analyses were performed for different groups of workers who started
new jobs between 1984 and 1997. Likely insiders are the ones who switch directly between
jobs while more disadvantaged groups should be the ones who have to find a way (back) into
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stable employment: workers entering from unemployment or non-participation as well as
workers finishing a degree. The paper shows some support for this hypothesis. Full-time
workers who switch jobs are less likely to leave their job in the 1990s than in the 1980s, but
workers entering from unemployment and non-participation are more likely to terminate their
jobs. Labor market entrants also experience an increase in the risk of job termination but not
as strongly as males who were unemployed prior to the job or women who entered from non-
participation.
Appendix
I. The German Socioeconomic Panel
The GSOEP is a panel of approximately 6000 German households and has been conducted
annually since 1984. All adults in participating households are interviewed once a year,
usually in spring. The questions cover economic and social conditions of all household
members. The major topics of interest in this data set are population and demography,
education, training and qualification, labor market and occupational dynamics, earnings and
income, social security, housing, health, household production and preferences. The original
survey started in western Germany and expanded to eastern Germany in 1990. For further
detailed information on the data set see German Institute for Economic Research (1996).
Only those individuals living in western Germany were selected, including all
available samples A and B. As foreigners are oversampled to allow individual analysis, the
reported descriptive cross sectional statistics are weighted by the respective sample weights.
II. Extracting Spell Data from the GSOEP
The duration analysis is performed with the help of two different types of data sets from the
GSOEP, a monthly spell data set with information from the calendar and a data set that uses
the detailed information on the job at the interview time. How the two different types of
information are matched is described in this appendix.
The spell data is derived from the calendar which includes information on the
employment status each month. This is the only monthly information in the GSOEP. Other
variables like wages, industry or occupation are only covered once a year in the survey. The
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monthly spell data set includes the following important variables: person identifier, begin of
the spell, end of the spell and spelltype. The analysis cannot be build on these spell data alone,
because important information on the characteristics of the job and job changes without
intervening spells of other activities are missing. Therefore the following cross sectional
information is merged to the spell data:
1. Several job characteristics: industry, occupation, firm size, employment status, 2.
"Why did your last job end?", 3. "When did you last job end?", 4. "Did you finish training or
school since the beginning of last year?", 5. "Which type of degree did you attain?". With the
help of this information the spell data was transformed as follows: when a job ending was
reported, the respective employment spell was splittet if it was not a within firm job change.
One problem with this procedure, however, occurs when workers switch between part-time
and full-time employment (or between full-time jobs with intervening breaks) and report the
job ending slightly differently than in the calendar. In this case implausible short jobs could
be introduced with the splitting procedure, so that it was checked whether a new part-time or
full-time employment spell begins within three months. In this case the split was not
performed. After splitting the spell data other information was added to the spells by checking
the start and ending date of the spell and the time of the interview. That way the values at the
start of the job were matched.
Finally, for the purposes of this investigation it was also necessary to get information
on the origin and destination state, i.e. the major activities of the individuals post and prior to
the job spell. As some activities can be parallel the following hierarchy was introduced to
make most use of the data: 1. full-time employment, 2. school, 3. unemployment, 4. part-time,
5. non-participation.
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Table 1 - Median Tenure in Years
Men Women
Median tenure Observations Median tenure Observations
1984 10.1 3650 6.1 2177
1985 9.7 3736 5.9 2290
1986 9.8 3546 6.4 2145
1987 9.9 3476 6.8 2108
1988 10 3291 6.6 2097
1989 9.9 3211 6.5 2096
1990 9.9 3176 6.4 2133
1991 9.9 3167 6.5 2167
1992 9.8 3070 6.7 2097
1993 9.6 3005 6.6 2109
1994 9.5 2867 6.8 2030
1995 9.3 2754 6.5 1941
1996 8.8 2715 6.8 1944
1997 8.5 2644 5.8 1910
Note: All observations are weighted by the GSOEP sample weight.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984-1997 (samples A and B)
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Table 2 - Logit Analyis: Probability of Elapsed Tenure ≤ 1, ≥ 10 and ≥ 20 years
All All All Men Women
I II III IV V VI VII
Tenure ≤ 1 yeara
Time trend 0.051** . . 0.049** . 0.050** .
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
1990-1997 . 0.262** . . . . .
(0.055)
1990-1992 . . 0.171** . 0.079 . 0.262**
(0.062) (0.086) (0.092)
1993-1997 . . 0.397** . 0.462** . 0.330**
(0.087) (0.116) (0.109)
unemployment growth -0.723** -0.322 -.778** -1.002** -1.346** -0.336 -0.139
(0.238) (0.236) (0.274) (0.337) (0.383) (0.338) (0.391)
Tenure ≥ 10 yearb
Time trend -0.022** . . -0.017* . -0.030** .
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
1990-1997 . -0.102* . . . . .
(0.041)
1990-1992 . . -0.044 . 0.016 . -0.117
(0.046) (0.061) (0.074)
1993-1997 . . -0.182** . -0.154* . -0.230**
(0.059) (0.075) (0.088)
unemployment growth 0.119 -0.061 0.214 0.160 0.360 0.080 0.096
(0.176) (0.168) (0.206) (0.236) (0.281) (0.269) (0.310)
Tenure ≥ 20 yearsc
Time trend 0.003 . . 0.011 . -0.003 .
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
1990-1997 . -0.021 . . . . .
(0.052)
1990-1992 . . -0.068 . 0.001 . -0.160
(0.061) (0.074) (0.116)
1993-1997 . . 0.046 . 0.130 . -0.047
(0.072) (0.087) (0.130)
unemployment growth -0.003 0.073 -0.154 0.201 0.038 -0.307 -0.430
(0.231) (0.218) (0.270) (0.282) (0.334) (0.409) (0.476)
Note: All models include controls for age, education, industry, firm size, worker status and changes in the
national unemployment rate. See Appendix Tables 1-3 for complete set of results. Self-employed, trainees,
agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), non-profit organizations and all observations with missing values
are excluded. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. One * indicates significance at the 5%
significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level (one-sided tests).
a
 The included age range is 16-64. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 if job duration is less
than or equal to one year.
b The included age range is 35-64. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 if job duration is
greater than or equal to ten years.
c
 The included age range is 45-64. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 if job duration is
greater than or equal to twenty years.
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984-1997. Weighted using the GSOEP sample weights.
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Table 3 - Frequencies in the Duration Analysis




Observations irrespective of missing values for
covariates
12564 3020 1726
Failure 8911 (70.9%) 2183 (72.3%) 1174 (68.0%)
Observations without missing values for
covariates
4950 936 660
Failure 1813 (44.7%) 470 (50.2%) 308 (46.7%)
Time 1984-1989 1727 (42.5%) 473 (50.5%) 298 (45.2%)
1990-1992 1111 (27.4%) 176 (18.8%) 160 (24.2%)
1993-1997 1221 (30.1%) 287 (30.7%) 202 (30.6%)
Sex Female 2072 (51%) 355 (37.9%) 298 (45.2%)
Male 1981 (49%) 581 (62.1%) 362 (54.8%)
Age < 20 245 (6%) 42 (4.5%) 136 (20.6%)
20-25 1375 (33.9%) 315 (33.7%) 403 (60.1%)
> 25 (max 55) 2439 (60.1%) 579 (61.9%) 121 (18.3%)
Education Compulsory Education 1167 (28.8%) 362 (32.3%) 81 (12.3%)
Training 2521 (62.1%) 562 (60.0%) 487 (73.8%)
University 371 (9.1%) 72 (7.7%) 92 (13.9%)
Foreigner 1103 (27.2%) 325 (34.7%) 168 (25.5%)
Parttime 874 (21.5%) 89 (9.5%) 29 (4.4%)
Status Less skilled blue collar 1203 (29.6%) 374 (40%) 191 (28.9%)
Skilled blue collar 813 (20.0%) 197 (21%) 266 (40.3%)
Less skilled white collar 1636 (40.3%) 291 (31.1%) 304 (46.1%)
Skilled white collar 407 (10.0%) 74 (7.9%) 90 (13.6%)
Firm size small 1188 (29.3%) 291 (31.1%) 186 (28.2%)
medium 1218 (30.0%) 313 (33.4%) 165 (25.0%)
large 1653 (40.7%) 332 (35.5%) 309 (46.8%)
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Table 3 continued




Industry Energy, water, mining 53 (1.3%) 11 (1.2%) 9 (1.4%)
Manufacturing 1506 (37.1%) 372 (39.7%) 275 (41.7%)
Construction 386 (9.5%) 135 (14.4%) 49 (7.4%)
Trade 612 (15.1%) 137 (14.6%) 76 (11.5%)
Transport 199 (4.9%) 42 (4.5%) 24 (3.6%)
Credit and insurance 142 (3.5%) 17 (1.8%) 28 (4.2%)
Services 949 (23.4%) 185 (19.8%) 170 (25.8%)
State and social insurance 212 (5.2%) 37 (4.0%) 29 (4.4%)
Origin Full-time employment 940 (23.2%) - 10 (1.5%)
Education/training/university 755 (18.6%) - 487 (73.8%)
Unemployment 936 (23.1%) 936 (100%) 105 (15.9%)
Part-time /marginal  employment 412 (10.2%) - 9 (1.4%)
Non-participation / other 1014 (25.0%) - 49 (7.4%)
Destination Full-time employment 643 (35.5%) 178 (36.6%) 161 (50.5%)
Education/training/university 89 (4.9%) 11 (2.3%) 18 (5.6%)
Unemployment 564 (31.1%) 229 (47.1%) 61 (19.1%)
Part-time /marginal  employment 99 (5.5%) 12 (2.5%) 6 (1.9%)
Non-participation / other 418 (23.1%) 56 (11.5%) 73 (22.9%)
Reason Involuntary 685 (16.9%) 247 (26.4%) 88 (13.3%)
Voluntary 949 (23.4%) 206 (22%) 173 (26.2%)
Unemployment experience 1425 (35.1%) 641 (68.5%) 101 (15.3%)
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 Table 4 - The Risk of Job Termination for All New Jobs Between 1984-1997:
Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models
All Spells Without missings All Spells Without missings
I II III IV
α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic
1990-1992a 1.086* (2.319) 1.175* (2.553) 1.047 (1.196) 1.077 (0.985)
1993-1997a 1.181** (4.451) 1.413** (4.017) 1.096* (2.228) 1.011 (0.101)
Parttime 1.350** (9.422) 1.137 (1.364) 1.375** (9.938) 1.176+ (1.741)
Parttime * (1990-1992) 0.981 (-0.354) 1.004 (0.030) 0.997 (-0.049 1.040 (0.310)
Parttime * (1993-1997) 0.829** (-3.207) 0.656** (-2.594) 0.866* (-2.429) 0.780 (-1.517)
Layoff . . . . 1.319** (6.616) 3.155** (15.542)
Layoff * (1990-1992) . . . . 1.204** (2.699) 1.261* (2.019)
Layoff * (1993-1997) . . . . 1.337** (3.893) 2.872** (7.718)
Unemployment rate 0.875** (-9.785) 0.805** (-7.961) 0.886** (-8.807) 0.830** (-6.784)
Unemployment
experience dummy
1.025 (1.055) 1.246** (4.373) 0.992 (-0.361) 1.107* (1.995)
Age 0.988** (-10.408) 0.976** (-8.427) 0.988** (-10.977) 0.973** (-9.635)
Foreign 0.818** (-7.666) 0.765** (-4.315) 0.816** (-7.744) 0.743** (-4.743)
Female 0.887** (-4.885) 1.056 (0.898) 0.902** (-4.189) 1.097 (1.553)
Trainingb 0.760** (-9.945) 0.981 (-0.312) 0.762** (-9.825) 1.006 (0.100)
Universityb 0.891+ (-1.885) 1.370** (2.746) 0.903+ (-1.678) 1.384* (2.816)
Skilled blue collarc 0.822** (-4.225) 0.743** (-3.887) 0.835** (-3.901) 0.800** (-2.951)
Unskilled white collarc 0.844** (-4.373) 0.700** (-5.144) 0.850** (-4.184) 0.783** (-3.500)
Skilled white collarc 0.641** (-6.407) 0.497** (-5.927) 0.642** (-6.359) 0.529** (-5.345)
Status missingc 3.914** (28.091) . . 3.915** (28.060) . .
Small firm < 20d 1.195** (4.700) 1.222** (3.294) 1.186** (4.491) 1.152* (2.329)
Large firm > 200d 0.802** (-5.783) 0.729** (-5.270) 0.803** (-5.740) 0.738** (-5.053)
Firm size missingd 1.610** (7.615) . . 1.601** (7.528) . .
Observations 12564 4059 12564 4059
   Failures 8911 1813 8911 1813
Log Likelihood -73867 -13715 -73778 -13372
LR-Chi2 7070** 378** 7245** 1064**
Note:.a: Control group: Jobs starting between 1984-1989. b: Control group: compulsory education or Abitur only.
c: Control group: unskilled blue collar worker. d: Control group: firm with 20-200 employees. One * indicates
significance at the 5% significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level
(two-sided tests). Controls for seven 1-digit industry groups are included. Unemployment is allowed to vary over
time.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP. Reported are the hazard ratios or α-coefficients for the covariates,
where α=exp(β) and (α-1) × 100 = percentage effect of a covariate on the job separation risk.
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Table 5 - The Risk of Job Termination for Different Groups 1984-1997:
Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models






















































































































































Note: Control group: Jobs starting between 1984-1989. One * indicates significance at the 5% significance level,
two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level (two-sided tests). For the complete set of
results see Appendix Tables A4-A8.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP. Reported are the hazard ratios or α-coefficients for the covariates,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A1 - Logit Analyis: Probability of Elapsed Tenure ≤ 1 Year
All All All Men Women
I II III IV V VI VII
Constant -6.937** -2.521** -2.544** -6.723** -2.464** -6.911** -2.562**
(0.841) (0.121) (0.121) (1.090) (0.200) (0.992) (0.154)
Time trend 0.051** . . 0.049** . 0.050** .
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
1990-1997 . 0.262** . . . . .
(0.055)
1990-1992 . . 0.171** . 0.079 . 0.262**
(0.062) (0.086) (0.092)
1993-1997 . . 0.397** . 0.462** . 0.330**
(0.087) (0.116) (0.109)
∆ unemployment rate -0.723** -0.322 -.778** -1.002** -1.346** -0.336 -0.139
(0.238) (0.236) (0.274) (0.337) (0.383) (0.338) (0.391)
High School (Abitur) 0.490** 0.510** -0.778** 0.108 0.111 0.505+ 0.519*
(0.174) (0.174) (0.274) (0.318) (0.320) (0.261) (0.259)
Training 0.059 0.056 0.499** 0.034 0.032 0.049 0.047
(0.087) (0.087) (0.174) (0.151) (0.152) (0.099) (0.099)
University 0.744** 0.734** 0.057 0.696** 0.684** 0.697** 0.699**
(0.123) (0.123) (0.087) (0.213) (0.215) (0.169) (0.170)
Parttime 0.267** 0.279** 0.735** 1.163* 1.185* 0.211* 0.219**
(0.100) (0.102) (0.123) (0.467) (0.476) (0.083) (0.083)
Firm size < 20 0.250** 0.252** 0.253** 0.247* 0.256* 0.304** 0.304**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.099) (0.099) (0.088) (0.088)
Firm size > 200 -0.318** -0.318** -0.315** -0.536** -0.531** -0.144+ -0.143+
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086)
Skilled blue collar -0.805** -0.793** -0.798** -0.822** -0.818** -0.789** -0.773**
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.096) (0.096) (0.188) (0.189)
Unskilled white collar -0.345** -0.355** -0.352** -0.193+ -0.195+ -0.353** -0.357**
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.116) (0.117) (0.103) (0.104)
Skilled white collar -0.646** -0.611** -0.625** -0.741** -0.728** -0.537** -0.508**
(0.094) (0.091) (0.092) (0.139) (0.137) (0.116) (0.116)
Observations 49103 29481 19622
Log-Likelihood -13959 -13972 -13966 -7732 -7727 -6031 -6040
Wald-Chi2 1601** 1605** 1616** 1053** 1076** 761** 750**
Note: The included age range is 16-64. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 if job duration is
less than or equal to one year. Self-employed, trainees, agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), non-profit
organizations and all observations with missing values are excluded. All models include seven industry dummies
for eight one-digit industries and eight age dummies for nine categories: 16-20, 21-25,26-30 and so forth.
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. One * indicates significance at the 5% significance level,
two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level (one-sided tests). Reference group:
unskilled blue collar with compulsory education (Hauptschule or Realschule) in medium sized firm (20-200
employees).
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984-1997. Weighted using the GSOEP sample weights.
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Appendix Table A2 - Logit Analyis: Probability of Elapsed Tenure ≥ 10 Year
All All All Men Women
I II III IV V VI VII
Constant 1.590** -0.177** -0.165* 1.172+ 0.006 2.162** -0.354**
(0.537) (0.066) (0.066) (0.661) (0.095) (0.799) (0.098)
Time trend -0.022** . . -0.017* . -0.030** .
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
1990-1997 . -0.102* . . . . .
(0.041)
1990-1992 . . -0.044 . 0.016 . -0.117
(0.046) (0.061) (0.074)
1993-1997 . . -0.182** . -0.154* . -0.230**
(0.059) (0.075) (0.088)
∆ unemployment rate 0.119 -0.061 0.214 0.160 0.360 0.080 0.096
(0.176) (0.168) (0.206) (0.236) (0.281) (0.269) (0.310)
High School  (Abitur) -0.542* -0.517* 0.214 -1.033** -1.014** 0.235 0.263
(0.255) (0.263) (0.206) (0.310) (0.318) (0.605) (0.611)
Training -0.177** -0.173** -0.509+ -0.251** -0.236** -0.160* -0.162*
(0.054) (0.054) (0.262) (0.084) (0.086) (0.070) (0.070)
University -0.643** -0.625** -0.172** -0.800** -0.770** -0.476** -0.475**
(0.087) (0.088) (0.054) (0.119) (0.121) (0.172) (0.172)
Parttime -0.544** -0.550** -0.624** -1.784** -1.779** -0.378** -0.378**
(0.059) (0.060) (0.088) (0.594) (0.604) (0.057) (0.057)
Firm size < 20 -0.300** -0.300** -0.300** -0.351** -0.350** -0.339** -0.340**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080)
Firm size > 200 0.677** 0.673** 0.673** 0.953** 0.947** 0.272** 0.271**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.058) (0.058) (0.069) (0.069)
Skilled blue collar 0.656** 0.654** 0.654** 0.538** 0.529** 0.652** 0.643**
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.073) (0.074) (0.157) (0.157)
Unskilled white collar 0.361** 0.370** 0.367** 0.367** 0.377** 0.426** 0.430**
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.091) (0.092) (0.082) (0.082)
Skilled white collar 0.443** 0.429** 0.435** 0.254** 0.241** 0.702** 0.690**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.083) (0.084) (0.094) (0.094)
Observations 29443 18253 11190
Log-Likelihood -17499 -17455 -17458 -10361 -10293 -6905 -6909
Wald-Chi2 1895** 1941** 1938** 1069** 1121** 781** 786**
Note: The included age range is 35-64. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 if job duration is
greater than or equal to ten years. Self-employed, trainees, agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), non-
profit organizations and all observations with missing values are excluded. All models include seven industry
dummies for eight one-digit industries and five age dummies for six catagories 35-39, 40-44, 45-49 and so
forth). Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. One * indicates significance at the 5%
significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level (one-sided tests).
Reference group: unskilled blue collar with compulsory education (Hauptschule or Realschule) in medium sized
firm (20-200 employees).
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984-1997. Weighted using the GSOEP sample weights.
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Appendix Table A3 - Logit Analyis: Probability of Elapsed Tenure ≥ 20 Year
All All All Men Women
I II III IV V VI VII
Constant -2.046** -1.756** -1.770** -2.687** -1.738** -1.696 -1.884**
(0.647) (0.084) (0.084) (0.760) (0.104) (1.221) (0.152)
Time trend 0.003 . . 0.011 . -0.003 .
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
1990-1997 . -0.021 . . . . .
(0.052)
1990-1992 . . -0.068 . 0.001 . -0.160
(0.061) (0.074) (0.116)
1993-1997 . . 0.046 . 0.130 . -0.047
(0.072) (0.087) (0.130)
∆ unemployment rate -0.003 0.073 -0.154 0.201 0.038 -0.307 -0.430
(0.231) (0.218) (0.270) (0.282) (0.334) (0.409) (0.476)
High School  (Abitur) 0.353 0.350 0.341 0.461 0.456 0.127 0.117
(0.367) (0.364) (0.367) (0.447) (0.448) (0.692) (0.693)
Training 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.028 0.027 -0.057 -0.056
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.083) (0.083) (0.102) (0.102)
University -0.263* -0.270* -0.269* -0.304* -0.307* -0.410+ -0.420+
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.137) (0.138) (0.226) (0.226)
Parttime -0.746** -0.742** -0.745** -1.624** -1.624** -0.461** -0.462**
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.513) (0.514) (0.091) (0.091)
Firm size < 20 0.222** 0.223** 0.223** 0.230* 0.230* 0.253+ 0.261+
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.099) (0.099) (0.137) (0.137)
Firm size > 200 0.814** 0.814** 0.815** 0.817** 0.818** 0.788** 0.791**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.068) (0.068) (0.110) (0.110)
Skilled blue collar 0.804** 0.805** 0.806** 0.745** 0.747** 0.844** 0.847**
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.082) (0.082) (0.230) (0.232)
Unskilled white collar 0.441** 0.435** 0.437** 0.565** 0.565** 0.426** 0.413**
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.102) (0.102) (0.117) (0.117)
Skilled white collar 0.929** 0.938** 0.934** 0.954** 0.956** 0.896** 0.913**
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.093) (0.093) (0.143) (0.142)
Observations 17103 10894 6202
Log-Likelihood -9987 -9988 -9987 -6890 -6890 -3083 -3082
Wald-Chi2 1895** 1941** 1938** 1069** 1121** 781** 786**
Note: The included age range is 45-64. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 if job duration is
greater than or equal to twenty years. Self-employed, trainees, agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), non-
profit organizations and all observations with missing values are excluded. All models include seven industry
dummies for eight one-digit industries and three age dummies for four categories: 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64.
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. One * indicates significance at the 5% significance level,
two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level (one-sided tests). Reference group:
unskilled blue collar with compulsory education (Hauptschule or Realschule) in medium sized firm (20-200
employees).
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984-1997. Weighted using the GSOEP sample weights.
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Appendix Table A4 - The Risk of Job Termination for Workers Switching from Full-Time
Employment: Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models
All Job Switchers All Job Switchers
I II III IV
Males Females
α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic
1990-1992a 0.915 (-1.027) 0.829* (-2.022) 0.900 (-0.945) 0.865 (-1.053)
1993-1997a 0.814+ (-1.810) 0.717** (-2.685) 0.675* (-2.476) 1.022 (0.128)
Parttime 1.365** (3.317) 1.380** (3.426) 2.335** (5.493) 1.023 (0.181)
Parttime * (1990-1992) 1.315* (1.971) 1.417* (2.485) 1.168 (0.660) 1.477* (2.039)
Parttime * (1993-1997) 1.491** (2.685) 1.624** (3.204) 1.369 (1.327) 1.299 (1.267)
Layoff . . 1.526** (3.429) . . . .
Layoff * (1990-1992) . . 1.802** (3.171) . . . .
Layoff * (1993-1997) . . 1.373** (1.611) . . . .
Unemployment 0.962 (-1.103) 0.977 (-0.671) 0.984 (-0.301) 0.959 (-0.888)
Unemployment
experience dummy
1.028 (0.456) 1.013 (0.221) 0.980 (-0.225) 1.119 (1.318)
Age 0.986** (-4.266) 0.986** (-4.200) 0.995 (-0.916) 0.985** (-3.406)
Foreign 0.852* (-2.284) 0.856* (-2.201) 0.762** (-2.721) 0.938 (-0.629)
Female 0.915 (-1.303) 0.940 (-0.908) . . . .
Trainingb 0.894 (-1.558) 0.923 (-1.119) 0.794* (-2.220) 1.025 (0.239)
Universityb 0.910 (-0.660) 0.953 (-0.342) 0.587** (-2.660) 1.283 (1.201)
Skilled blue collarc 0.803* (-1.998) 0.822+ (-1.779) 0.751* (-2.152) 0.942 (-0.260)
Unskilled white collarc 0.792* (-2.435) 0.796* (-2.379) 0.697* (-2.176) 0.811* (-1.670)
Skilled white collarc 0.735* (-2.150) 0.723* (-2.280) 0.555** (-3.076) 0.963 (-0.170)
Status missingc 3.274** (7.332) 3.424** (7.653) 2.155** (3.123) 4.064** (6.355)
Small firm < 20d 1.196* (2.104) 1.183* (1.976) 1.364* (2.443) 1.070 (0.582)
Large firm > 200d 0.734** (-3.708) 0.750** (-3.446) 0.763* (-2.184) 0.670** (-3.462)
Firm size missingd 1.724** (3.079) 1.742** (3.143) 2.086** (2.679) 1.451 (1.560)
Observations 2086 2086 1040 1046
Failures 1345 1345 627 718
Log Likelihood -8794 -8757 -3646 -4177
LR-Chi2 952 1026** 580** 453**
Note:.a: Control group: Jobs starting between 1984-1989. b: Control group: compulsory education or Abitur only.
c: Control group: unskilled blue collar worker. d: Control group: firm with 20-200 employees. One * indicates
significance at the 5% significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level
(two-sided tests). Controls for seven 1-digit industry groups are included. Unemployment is allowed to vary over
time.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP. Reported are the hazard ratios or α-coefficients for the covariates,
where α=exp(β) and (α-1) × 100 = percentage effect of a covariate on the job separation risk.
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Appendix Table A5 - The Risk of Job Termination for Workers Entering from  Un- or Non
participation: Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models
Unemployment Non-participation
I II III IV
α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic
1990-1992a 1.101 (1.303) 1.070 (0.809) 1.104 (1.313) 1.025 (0.312)
1993-1997a 1.189** (2.750) 1.011 (0.151) 1.250** (2.732) 1.185+ (1.951)
Parttime 1.281** (2.673) 1.294** (2.784) 1.116+ (1.779) 1.129* (1.961)
Parttime * (1990-1992) 1.015 (0.099) 1.035 (0.221) 0.950 (-0.528) 0.994 (-0.059)
Parttime * (1993-1997) 0.872 (-0.923) 0.937 (-0.433) 0.740** (-2.716) 0.771* (-2.313)
Layoff . . 1.272** (3.629) . . 1.157 (1.621)
Layoff * (1990-1992) . . 1.115 (0.861) . . 1.428* (2.546)
Layoff * (1993-1997) . . 1.567** (3.824) . . 1.476* (2.115)
Unemployment rate 0.864** (-4.857) 0.883** (-4.140) 0.880** (-5.009) 0.889** (-4.590)
Unemployment
experience dummy
1.090+ (1.668) 1.082 (1.509) 1.065 (1.356) 1.045 (0.943)
Age 0.991** (-4.275) 0.990** (-4.672) 0.991** (-4.084) 0.991** (-4.179)
Foreign 0.921+ (-1.682) 0.925 (-1.582) 0.795** (-4.557) 0.796** (-4.507)
Female 0.992 (-0.159) 1.005 (0.106) 0.958 (-0.747) 0.963 (-0.662)
Trainingb 0.742** (-5.621) 0.743** (-5.613) 0.750** (-5.720) 0.749** (-5.756)
Universityb 0.924 (-0.594) 0.950 (-0.383) 0.921 (-0.697) 0.936 (-0.553)
Skilled blue collarc 0.905 (-1.235) 0.924 (-0.979) 0.773** (-2.641) 0.788* (-2.448)
Unskilled white collarc 0.766** (-3.175) 0.781** (-2.944) 0.913 (-1.342) 0.923 (-1.178)
Skilled white collarc 0.733* (-2.099) 0.727* (-2.140) 0.677** (-2.614) 0.683* (-2.545)
Status missingc 3.572** (13.121) 3.505** (12.856) 4.134** (17.178) 4.197** (17.298)
Small firm < 20d 1.141+ (1.802) 1.135+ (1.725) 1.262** (3.083) 1.253* (2.989)
Large firm > 200d 0.794** (-2.968) 0.791** (-3.015) 0.874+ (-1.787) 0.866+ (-1.908)
Firm size missingd 1.318* (2.248) 1.309* (2.185) 2.047** (6.088) 2.012** (5.932)
Observations 3020 3020 3445 3445
   Failures 2183 2183 2466 2466
Log Likelihood -15059 -15025 -17298 -17282
LR-Chi2 1476** 1542** 1855** 1887**
Note:.a: Control group: Jobs starting between 1984-1989. b: Control group: compulsory education or Abitur only.
c: Control group: unskilled blue collar worker. d: Control group: firm with 20-200 employees. One * indicates
significance at the 5% significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level
(two-sided tests). Controls for seven 1-digit industry groups are included. Unemployment is allowed to vary over
time.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP. Reported are the hazard ratios or α-coefficients for the covariates,
where α=exp(β) and (α-1) × 100 = percentage effect of a covariate on the job separation risk.
32
Appendix Table A6 - The Risk of Job Termination for Men and Women:
Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models
All Job Spells All Job Spells
I II III IV
Males Males Females Females
α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic
1990-1992a 1.005 (0.101) 0.966 (-0.662) 1.224** (3.817) 1.182** (3.012)
1993-1997a 1.104* (1.984) 1.026 (0.458) 1.289** (4.469) 1.195** (2.932)
Parttime 1.698** (9.458) 1.759** (10.010) 1.261** (5.745) 1.278** (6.072)
Parttime * (1990-1992) 1.055 (0.592) 1.057 (0.613) 0.877+ (-1.875) 0.889+ (-1.674)
Parttime * (1993-1997) 0.840+ (-1.788) 0.861 (-1.517) 0.768** (-3.401) 0.803** (-2.805)
Layoff . . 1.337** (5.121) . . 1.279** (3.927)
Layoff * (1990-1992) . . 1.181+ (1.778) . . 1.280* (2.410)
Layoff * (1993-1997) . . 1.277* (2.450) . . 1.473** (3.423)
Unemployment 0.876** (-6.400) 0.888** (-5.720) 0.879** (-7.053) 0.889** (-6.386)
Unemployment
experience dummy
0.977 (-0.670) 0.941+ (-1.735) 1.064* (1.970) 1.035 (1.074)
Age 0.993** (-4.087) 0.992** (-4.637) 0.987** (-8.490) 0.987** (-8.660)
Foreign 0.831** (-4.906) 0.833** (-4.837) 0.826** (-5.206) 0.823** (-5.322)
Female . . 0.784** (-5.835) . 0.780** (-6.630)
Trainingb 0.774** (-6.163) 0.806* (-2.448) 0.782** (-6.551) 1.026 (0.301)
Universityb 0.794** (-2.621) 0.811** (-3.676) 1.015 (0.180) 0.941 (-0.651)
Skilled blue collarc 0.802** (-3.869) 0.768** (-3.820) 0.937 (-0.699) 0.896* (-2.218
Unskilled white collarc 0.761** (-3.934) 0.545** (-6.362) 0.885* (-2.492) 0.828+ (-1.833)
Skilled white collarc 0.544** (-6.379) 3.492** (17.246) 0.830+ (-1.813) 4.137** (21.622)
Status missingc 3.491** (17.228) 1.235** (3.764) 4.126** (21.644) 1.155** (2.788)
Small firm < 20d 1.251** (3.982) 0.747** (-5.183) 1.160** (2.864) 0.859** (-2.896)
Large firm > 200d 0.748** (-5.172) 1.619** (5.163) 0.858** (-2.921) 1.633** (5.786)
Firm size missingd 1.644** (5.321) 1.623** (5.725)
Observations 5903 5903 6661 6661
Failures 4139 4139 4772 4772
Log Likelihood -31151 -31102 -36513 -36471
LR-Chi2 3667** 3761** 3480** 3565**
Note:.a: Control group: Jobs starting between 1984-1989. b: Control group: compulsory education or Abitur only.
c: Control group: unskilled blue collar worker. d: Control group: firm with 20-200 employees. One * indicates
significance at the 5% significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level
(two-sided tests). Controls for seven 1-digit industry groups are included. Unemployment is allowed to vary over
time.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP. Reported are the hazard ratios or α-coefficients for the covariates,
where α=exp(β) and (α-1) × 100 = percentage effect of a covariate on the job separation risk.
33
Appendix Table A7 - The Risk of Job Termination for Men and Women Entering from
Unemployment or Non-Participation: Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models
Entering from Unemployment Entering from Non-participation
I II I II
Males Females Males Females
α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic α t-statistic
1990-1992a 1.098 (1.019) 1.100 (0.752) 1.099 (0.808) 1.196+ (1.748)
1993-1997a 1.209* (2.527) 1.167 (1.316) 1.154 (1.137) 1.310* (2.449)
Parttime 2.495** (5.340) 1.121 (1.001) 1.715** (2.965) 1.065 (0.919)
Parttime * (1990-1992) 0.535* (-2.186) 1.129 (0.600) 1.420 (1.249) 0.856 (-1.304)
Parttime * (1993-1997) 0.592+ (-1.848) 0.947 (-0.278) 0.800 (-0.793) 0.687** (-2.777)
Layoff . . . . . . . .
Layoff * (1990-1992) . . . . . . . .
Layoff * (1993-1997) . . . . . . . .
Unemployment 0.872** (-3.526) 0.848** (-3.451) 0.924 (-1.551) 0.874** (-4.564)
Unemployment
experience dummy
1.061 (0.857) 1.096 (1.141) 1.032 (0.318) 1.061 (1.103)
Age 0.993* (-2.441) 0.986** (-3.614) 0.997 (-0.902) 0.990** (-4.012)
Foreign 0.921 (-1.353) 0.946 (-0.654) 0.808* (-2.195) 0.751** (-4.760)
Female
Trainingb 0.765** (-4.096) 0.708** (-3.716) 0.674** (-3.633) 0.781** (-4.336)
Universityb 0.779 (-1.450) 0.982 (-0.087) 0.855 (-0.645) 1.050 (0.359)
Skilled blue collarc 0.900 (-1.156) 0.877 (-0.612) 0.736* (-2.151) 0.865 (-0.905)
Unskilled white collarc 0.757* (-2.185) 0.805+ (-1.756) 0.720+ (-1.838) 0.968 (-0.430)
Skilled white collarc 0.732+ (-1.730) 0.847 (-0.641) 0.469** (-2.901) 0.905 (-0.523)
Status missingc 3.348** (9.993) 3.766** (7.958) 4.100** (6.546) 4.104** (15.700)
Small firm < 20d 1.098 (1.024) 1.255+ (1.818) 1.757** (3.866) 1.121 (1.280)
Large firm > 200d 0.718** (-3.314) 0.941 (-0.485) 0.822 (-1.427) 0.907 (-1.074)
Firm size missingd 1.319+ (1.804) 1.381 (1.534) 2.171** (2.923) 1.972** (5.075)
Observations 1903 1116 968 2477
   Failures 1384 799 636 1830
Log Likelihood -8912 -4699 -3631 -12228
LR-Chi2 951** 555** 612** 1278**
Note:.a: Control group: Jobs starting between 1984-1989. b: Control group: compulsory education or Abitur only.
c: Control group: unskilled blue collar worker. d: Control group: firm with 20-200 employees. One * indicates
significance at the 5% significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level
(two-sided tests). Controls for seven 1-digit industry groups are included. Unemployment is allowed to vary over
time.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP. Reported are the hazard ratios or α-coefficients for the covariates,
where α=exp(β) and (α-1) × 100 = percentage effect of a covariate on the job separation risk.
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Appendix Table A8 - The Risk of Job Termination for Workers Having Recently Finished
Education or Training: Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models
All Spells
I II
α t-statistic α t-statistic
1990-1992a 1.073 (0.821) 1.052 (0.563)
1993-1997a 1.206+ (1.952) 1.160 (1.466)
Parttime 1.836** (5.165) 1.861** (5.272)
Parttime * (1990-1992) 0.951 (-0.269) 0.963 (-0.202)
Parttime * (1993-1997) 0.762 (-1.456) 0.748 (-1.552)
Layoff . . 1.518** (3.412)
Layoff * (1990-1992) . . 1.175 (0.803)
Layoff * (1993-1997) . . 1.229 (0.973)
Unemployment rate 0.893** (-3.029) 0.910* (-2.504)
Unemployment
experience dummy
1.100 (1.137) 1.067 (0.774)
Age 0.965** (-3.240) 0.967** (-3.002)
Foreign 0.616** (-6.288) 0.619** (-6.207)
Female 0.848* (-2.477) 0.851* (-2.410)
Trainingb 0.653** (-4.941) 0.660** (-4.811)
Universityb 0.829 (-1.201) 0.847 (-1.059)
Skilled blue collarc 0.683** (-2.812) 0.698** (-2.665)
Unskilled white collarc 0.674** (-3.103) 0.690** (-2.911)
Skilled white collarc 0.425** (-4.580) 0.426** (-4.572)
Status missingc 3.752** (8.179) 3.867** (8.537)
Small firm < 20d 1.361** (2.895) 1.330** (2.680)
Large firm > 200d 0.868 (-1.372) 0.860 (-1.458)
Firm size missingd 1.087 (0.430) 1.059 (0.300)
Observations 1726 1726
   Failures 1174 1174
Log Likelihood -7323 -7307
LR-Chi2 1886** 1119**
Note:.a: Control group: Jobs starting between 1984-1989. b: Control group: compulsory education or Abitur only.
c: Control group: unskilled blue collar worker. d: Control group: firm with 20-200 employees. One * indicates
significance at the 5% significance level, two ** at the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level
(two-sided tests). Controls for seven 1-digit industry groups are included. Unemployment is allowed to vary over
time.
Source: Own calculations using the GSOEP. Reported are the hazard ratios or α-coefficients for the covariates,
where α=exp(β) and (α-1) × 100 = percentage effect of a covariate on the job separation risk.
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Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland and Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt
für Arbeit.
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Figure 2 - The Evolution of Elapsed Tenure by Age Groups

























































































Figure 3 - The Evolution of Elapsed Tenure by Hours Worked


























































































Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP (samples A and B).
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Figure 4 - The Evolution of Elapsed Tenure by Industry



























































































Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP (samples A and B).
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Figure 5 - Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of All New Job Spells
Panel A - Two time periods: 1984-1989 and 1990-1997
Months







Panel B - Males and Females
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Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP (samples A and B).
